Interpretation of other offence in Section 141 third IPC
Section 141 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 defines ‘Unlawful assembly’.
As per sec. 141 ‘third’ IPC an assembly of five or more persons is designated an “unlawful assembly”, if the common object of the persons composing that assembly is—
Third.—To commit any mischief or criminal trespass, or other offence
The question before the Hon’ble Supreme court in this case i.e. Manga @ Man Singh vs. State of Uttarakhand, [Criminal Appeal No. 1156 of 2008, decided on May 3, 2013], was what is meaning of expression ‘other offence’ used in sec. 141 ‘third’
Appellant’s contention
The Appellant in this case contended that the “other offence” under Section 141 ‘third’ has been used along with the offence, mischief or criminal trespass. Thus it can only relate to similar such offences of the same species and not commission of all other offences (as in the case, murder etc.).
The Appellant based above contention on the basis of the principle ‘ejusdem generis’ which means ‘where a law lists specific classes of persons or things and then refers to them in general, the general statements only apply to the same kind of persons or things specifically listed.
Supreme court view
The Hon’ble Supreme court held that:
“Section 141 ‘third’, clearly mentions that an assembly of five or more persons is designated as an unlawful assembly if the common object of the persons composing that assembly as among other offences namely, mischief or criminal trespass or commission of other offence.
A literal interpretation, therefore, only means that apart from the offence of mischief and criminal trespass, all other offences would fall within the said clause ‘third’ mentioned in Section 141.
Other related sections falling under the said Chapter VIII are up to Section 160. Reading Section 141 ‘third’ along with Section 149, if the commission of any other offence apart from mischief or criminal trespass and such commission of offence was by a member of an unlawful assembly, the prescription of common object will automatically get satisfied.
When we refer to Section 144 in this context, we find that joining an unlawful assembly armed with a deadly weapon, which is likely to cause death, can be inflicted with a punishment prescribed therein.
If the interpretation placed by learned senior counsel is accepted, we wonder whether the prescription placed in Section 144 could be held to be in consonance with section 141 ‘third’. The definite answer can only be in the negative.
If mere possession of a deadly weapon by a member of an unlawful assembly, which is likely to cause death would attract Section 141 ‘third’ as a corollary, it will have to be held that the expression ‘or other offence’ mentioned in Section 141 should without doing any violence to the said provision, include all other offences apart from the offence of mischief or criminal trespass.
Similar will be the interpretation that can be made relating to the offence, namely, rioting prescribed under Section 146 punishable under Sections 147 as well as 148, namely, rioting, armed with deadly weapons.
Supreme Court further held
We fail to appreciate as to how simply because the offences mischief or criminal trespass are used preceding the expression “other offence” in Section 141 ‘third’, it should be taken that such offence would only relate to a minor offence of mischief or trespass and that the expression “other offence” should be restricted only to that extent.
As pointed out by us above, the offence of mischief and trespass could also be as grave as that of an offence of murder, for which the punishment of life imprisonment can be imposed as provided for under Sections 438, 449, 450 etc. Therefore, we straight away hold that the argument of learned senior counsel for the appellants to import the principle of ‘ejusdem generis’ to Section 141 ‘third’, cannot be accepted. [Para 43]
“The submission of the learned senior counsel cannot also be countenanced by applying Section 40 of the Code, which specifically mentions as to how the term ‘offence’ will have to be construed.
In the main clause of the said section it has been clearly set out that the word “offence” denotes a thing made punishable by this Code except the Chapters and Sections mentioned in clauses 2 and 3 of the said section.
Therefore, going by the main clause of Section 40, the word “offence” since denotes the thing made punishable under the Code, ‘other offence’ mentioned in Section 141 ‘third’, can only denote to offences, which are punishable under any of the provisions of the Code.
Therefore, by applying the main clause of Section 40, it can be straight away held that all offences referred to in any of the provisions of the Code for which the punishment is provided for would automatically fall within the expression “other offence”, which has been used in Section 141 ‘third’. [Para 43]
“Therefore, a conspectus reading of Section 40 makes the position abundantly clear that for all offences punishable under the Indian Penal Code, the main clause of Section 40 would straight away apply in which event the expression “other offence” used in Section 141 ‘third’, will have to be construed as any offence for which punishment is prescribed under the Code.
To put it differently, whomsoever is proceeded against for any offence punishable under the provisions of the Indian Penal Code, Section 40 sub-clause 1 would straight away apply for the purpose of construing what the offence is and when it comes to the question of offence under any other special or local law, the aid of sub-clauses 2 and 3 will have to be applied for the purpose of construing the offence for which the accused is proceeded against.
Therefore, having regard to sub-clause 1 of Section 40 of the Code read along with Section 141 ‘third’, the argument of learned senior counsel for the appellants will have to be rejected.
We are, therefore, of the firm view that only such a construction would be in tune with the purport and intent of the lawmakers while defining an unlawful assembly for commission of an offence with a common object, as specified under Section 141 of the Code. In the case on hand, since no special law or local law was attracted and the accuses were charged only for the offence under the Indian Penal Code, Section 40(1) gets attracted along with Section 141 ‘third’ IPC.
Having regard to such a construction of ours on Section 141, read along with Section 40 IPC, the offence found proved against the appellants, namely, falling under Sections 302 read with 149, 307 read with 149 along with 147 and 148 of the Code for which the conviction and sentence imposed by the Court below cannot be found fault with”. [Para 46]
Conclusion
For all offences punishable under the Indian Penal Code, the main clause of Section 40 would straight away apply in which event the expression “other offence” used in Section 141 ‘third’, will have to be construed as any offence for which punishment is prescribed under the Code.
Only such a construction would be in tune with the purport and intent of the lawmakers while defining an unlawful assembly for commission of an offence with a common object, as specified under Section 141 of the Code.
In the case on hand, since no special law or local law was attracted and the accuses were charged only for the offence under the Indian Penal Code, Section 40(1) gets attracted along with Section 141 ‘third’ IPC.